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According to the ‘standard story’ in the philosophy of action, actions are those
movements of a creature’s body that are caused and rationalized by the creature’s
mental states. The attractions of the causal condition have been widely discussed.
The rationalization condition is nearly ubiquitous, but it is notoriously obscure, and
its motivation has rarely been made explicit. This paper presents a new argument
for including the rationalization condition in the causal theory of action, and
sketches a broadly Davidsonian theory of what rationalization is.
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1. Introduction
One central question in the philosophy of action concerns what concepts we need in
order to understand the distinction between intentional actions and other things that
agents do. A second question concerns how to understand the idea of a motivating
reason for an action, or an agent’s purpose or goal in performing an action. The
causal-psychological theory of action (henceforth, the Causal Theory) answers these
questions by appeal to the concept of causation and the concepts of the mental
states. Intentional actions are events caused by a creature’s mind, and the elements
of the creature’s mind that did the causing are (or specify) its reasons for acting.
This ‘standard story’ of action [Velleman 2000; Smith 2012] is appealing because it dis-
tinguishes actions from other events, illuminates the use of reasons in action expla-
nations, and distinguishes the agent’s reasons for acting from the motives that could
have been reasons but were not [Davidson 1980a; Dancy 2000: 161].
Most versions of the Causal Theory appeal to additional concepts as well. Following
Davidson, many appeal to the controversial idea of non-deviant causation [Davidson
1980b; Stout 2011]. Also following Davidson, many hold that actions are caused and
rationalized by mental states.1 Unlike non-deviant causation, however, the idea of
rationalization has attracted little attention. Its proponents have rarely (if ever)
explained what it means and what work it is supposed to do, and those who do
without it have rarely (if ever) explained why. The concept of rationalization, while
widespread, is thus also somewhat mysterious.
© 2021 Australasian Journal of Philosophy
1 See, most clearly, Davidson [1980c]. He uses the term differently elsewhere [1980a]. Here is a sample of authors
who appeal to rationalization: Antony [1989], Moya [1998], Mintoff [2002], Hornsby [2004], Smith [2004b, 2012],
O’Brien [2006], Wedgwood [2006], Schlosser [2007, 2011], Hurley [2018], and Wald and Tenenbaum [2018],
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The aim of this paper is to shed light on the rationalization condition. I give a novel
argument for embracing the rationalization condition, and I sketch a theory of what it
is for mental states to rationalize action.
The paper argues for three main points. First, versions of the Causal Theory lacking
the rationalization condition face two important ‘subset problems’, both of which arise
from the Causal Theory’s identification of actions not with events, but with events
under particular descriptions. I argue that the subset problems provide a strong motiv-
ation for the rationalization condition.2 Second, I develop a design specification for a
theory of rationalization, and I argue that many theories of rationalization inspired by
the literature face serious problems in satisfying it. Finally, I propose a more satisfac-
tory theory of rationalization (and motivating reasons), inspired by Davidson,
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 gives an overview of the Causal Theory.
Section 2 considers an argument, inspired by some remarks of Kieran Setiya’s [2007,
2011, 2013], according to which the rationalization condition is both unmotivated
and subject to counterexamples.3 Section 3 responds to the first part of the Setiya-
inspired argument by exhibiting the two subset problems and showing how the ration-
alization condition promises to solve them. Section 4 generalizes the second part of the
Setiya-inspired argument, providing a design specification that any plausible theory of
rationalization must satisfy. Section 5 shows that three theories of rationalization
inspired by the literature fail to satisfy the design specification. Section 6 outlines a
superior theory of rationalization, and the conclusion considers a pair of questions
raised by the theory.
2. The Causal-Psychological Theory
In the spirit of Davidson [1980b], I understand the Causal Theory as two principles.
The first concerns bodily actions:
ACTION. An event involving a creature’s body is an intentional action only if it is non-deviantly
caused and rationalized by its mental states (for instance, by its beliefs, desires, or intentions).
The second concerns motivating reasons:
REASONS.When a creature Ds intentionally, its reasons for D-ing are (or are a function of) the
mental states that non-deviantly caused and rationalized its D-ing.
These principles constitute a minimal core of the Causal Theory, leaving room for dis-
agreement about how to understand mental actions, actions that are not bodily move-
ments, the ontology of motivating reasons, the nature of non-deviant causation, and so
on.
3. A Setiya-Inspired Argument
While not all versions of the Causal Theory include the rationalization condition (or an
analogue), I am not aware of any arguments against it. However, related discussions by
Setiya [2007, 2011, 2013] include ideas that generate such an argument, and provide a
natural frame for my discussion. The Setiya-inspired argument supports two
2 I suspect that something like the subset problems motivated Davidson’s original appeal to rationalization (see,
especially, [1980c]).
3 Related ideas can be found in Enç [2003].
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conclusions—that there is no plausible rationale for including the rationalization
condition in the Causal Theory, and, moreover, that the rationalization condition is
subject to counterexample. After explaining these, I reply to the first conclusion in
section 3, and the second conclusion in sections 4–6.
The first argument proceeds by elimination [Setiya 2007: 61–5]. It argues that each
of two natural rationales for the rationalization condition relies on an implausible
assumption about the relationship between action and normativity. So, the condition
is unmotivated.
The first rationale is the guise-of-the-good thesis (henceforth, GUISE), according to
which, whenever someone acts, they act because they see something good about their
action. In causal-psychological terms, this means that every intentional action is
caused, in part, by a belief that the action would be good (or has some other normative
property). Given the assumption that such beliefs rationalize actions, one might see the
rationalization condition as a way to incorporate GUISE into the Causal Theory.
Setiya argues (and I agree) that GUISE, so construed, is too strong to be credible.4 It
requires that every action be accompanied by a normative belief (not a mere ‘appear-
ance of goodness’), and that the belief be present at the time of action (not that the
creature be disposed to form it on reflection). Counterexamples to GUISE are
widely known [Velleman 2000a; Setiya 2007: 63], and it is rejected even by most pro-
ponents of the general thesis.
The second rationale that Setiya considers relies on Davidsonian ideas about motiv-
ating reasons and rationality. Here is John McDowell’s formulation of the idea [McDo-
well 1998: 328; cited at Setiya 2007: 64]:
[The] concepts of the propositional attitudes have their proper home in explanations of a
special sort: explanations in which things are made intelligible by being revealed to be, or to
approximate to being, as they rationally ought to be.
One might be led to the rationalization condition as a way to incorporate this influen-
tial idea into the Causal Theory.
Setiya argues convincingly that this idea is problematic. It seems to rule out, what is
evidently possible, that agents are sometimes highly irrational (and not even ‘approxi-
mate[ly]’ rational). And, crucially, the standard thought experiments appealed to in its
support are unpersuasive. Consider Nagel’s example of an agent who, driven by thirst,
attempts to put a coin into a pencil sharpener (discussed by Nagel [1970: 34]; cited by
Setiya [2007: 64]).5 This is highly irrational and perhaps, in a sense, unintelligible. But,
as long as the agent is sufficiently rational overall to justify the attribution of inten-
tional states, proponents of the Causal Theory will rightly insist that this particular
doing is an intentional action: it is not a reflex or an accident. Given that even
highly irrational doings can be actions, McDowell’s Davidsonian idea does not motiv-
ate the rationalization condition [Setiya 2007: 64–5]. So, the second rationale for the
rationalization condition is no more persuasive than the first.
The second Setiya-inspired argument follows from the argument against McDowell.
That argument assumed that highly irrational and seemingly unintelligible actions can
be intentional. If (as seems plausible) the rationalization condition requires that every
4 I discuss weaker versions of GUISE in [2016].
5 Compare also Levin [1988] and Quinn [1993].
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action is, to some degree, rational and intelligible, then the rationalization condition is
implausible.
4. The Job for the Rationalization Condition
Like Setiya, I reject GUISE and accept that actions can be highly irrational. Neverthe-
less, I disagree with both parts of the Setiya-inspired argument. In this section, I
respond to the first argument by presenting a novel motivation for the rationalization
condition: it provides a natural solution to two subset problems that versions of the
Causal Theory lacking rationalization have no clear way to solve.
4.1 The Leading Idea
Both problems are generated by an influential idea associated with Anscombe and
Davidson. According to the causal-psychological tradition, causation is a relation
between events, and so actions are constituted by events. But most causal-psycho-
logical theorists deny that the things that we do intentionally are individuated by
the events that constitute them. Anscombe and Davidson both argued that an
intentional action is an event ‘under a description’, since there may be many
descriptions of the event constituting an action under which it is not intentional.6
Other philosophers mark this idea in other ways. Some identify intentional actions
with properties of the events that constitute them, or with action-types that the
token actions instantiate [Goldman 1970: ch. 1]. My argument is general, targeting
any view on which intentional actions are individuated in a finer-grained way than
events are.
For concreteness, I will make two Davidsonian assumptions, although my argument
does not turn on them (as I will illustrate in section 4.3). The first assumption is that
actions are constituted by bare events (that is, events not under any particular descrip-
tions), but that intentional actions are individuated by pairs of events and (true)
descriptions of them. The second assumption is that events are concrete individuals,
individuated by regions of spacetime. On this view, an agent’s action is constituted
by the event that consists in the region of spacetime in which it is performing the
action.
Begin by considering a version of the Causal Theory without rationalization:
ACTION-.An event involving a creature’s body is an intentional action only if it is non-deviantly
caused by its mental states (for instance, by its beliefs, desires, or intentions).
REASONS-. When a creature Ds intentionally, its reasons for D-ing are (or are a function of)
the mental states that non-deviantly caused its D-ing.
My argument will be that, because causation is a relation between bare events, it is
too coarse-grained a relation to do some important action-theoretic work.
ACTION- and REASONS- thus need to be enriched. Because rationalization is a
relation of the appropriate fineness-of-grain, it is the right sort of relation to do
the relevant work.
6 This idea is discussed by Davidson [1980a, 1980e] and Anscombe [1981, 2000: 11–12], although Anscombe
employs it somewhat differently.
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4.2 Subset Problem 1: Identifying the Descriptions under Which an Action Is
Intentional
The first problem can be illustrated with an example from Davidson [1980a: 4–5]:
Midnight Prowler. A desires to illuminate their bedroom, believes that flipping the switch is a
way to do that, and so flips the switch. In so doing, A illuminates the room, awakens a person
sleeping in bed, and alerts a prowler in the backyard.
This case describes a single event that has many descriptions: it is a flipping of the
switch, an illuminating of the room, an awakening of a sleeper, and so on. (That
each describes the same event is famously supported by the plausibility of Davidson’s
[1980d] event semantics for change sentences.) Yet, crucially, the action is intentional
under only some of those descriptions. A did not alert the prowler intentionally.
The first subset problem is thus the problem of picking out, from the set of all
descriptions of this event, the descriptions under which it is intentional. ACTION-
alone cannot solve this problem. Causation is a relation between bare events, and all
of the relevant descriptions describe the same event. So (extending our language of
causation to allow talk of descriptions of events as being caused), anything that
caused one caused all of them. So, ACTION- has no way to identify, from the set of
all of the descriptions of A’s action, those under which it is intentional.
I will say more on how the rationalization condition solves this problem once I
introduce my theory of rationalization in section 6. But notice for now that the con-
dition is well-suited to the task. Rationalization is a relation between mental states
and actions under descriptions, not bare events, and so it is a relation with the appro-
priate fineness-of-grain to solve this problem. To illustrate, consider a revised version
of ACTION, where E is an event involving A’s body, and D is a description of E:
ACTION*. D is an intentional action only if there is a set of A’s mental states that non-deviantly
caused E and rationalized D.
Plausibly, in Midnight Prowler, A’s desire to illuminate the room (along with relevant
beliefs) ‘renders intelligible’ their flipping the switch, but not the other descriptions of
the action. So, given that gloss of the rationalization condition, ACTION* dis-
tinguishes that description of the event from the others, solving the first subset
problem.
4.3 Subset Problem 2: Identifying the Mental States that Are Motivating
Reasons
The second problem is generated by a familiar observation about motivating reasons.
An agent’s intentional action is constituted by an event, and that event can be caused
(in part) by many of the agent’s mental states. Yet, intuitively, not all of those causally
efficacious mental states must be (or specify)7 the agent’s reasons for having acted
under any particular description. The second subset problem is the problem of
picking out, from the set of the mental states involved in the causal production of
the action, the subset that gathers together the agent’s reasons for acting under any par-
ticular description.
7 For simplicity, this section will assume that motivating reasons are mental states, rather than a function of
mental states. Nothing in my argument will depend on that assumption.
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One way to illustrate the problem is with a case in which an agent does more than
one thing intentionally at the same time:8
Icy Sidewalk. A walks to the library because they desire to check out a book. A walks on the
sunny side of the street, because they want to avoid patches of ice on the shady side.
Intuitively, it seems possible for A’s desire to get the book to be their motivating reason
for walking to the library, but not their reason for walking on the sunny side of the
street. And it seems possible for A’s desire to avoid ice to be their reason for
walking on the sunny side of the street but not for walking to the library. After all,
A’s desire to check out the book might not explain A’s walking on the sunny side,
and A’s desire to avoid ice might not explain their walking to the library. Importantly,
however, if A’s walk to the library happened entirely on the sunny side of the street,
those two descriptions describe one event.
The second subset problem is the problem of picking out, from the set of all of the
mental states that caused an event (including, in Icy Sidewalk, both of the desires men-
tioned above), which ones are (or represent) the agent’s motivating reasons for the
action under any given description. It is straightforward to see why REASONS-
cannot solve this problem. Since causation is a relation between bare events,
REASONS- appears to entail that, necessarily, all of the mental states that caused a par-
ticular event are motivating reasons for the action under every description of it. It
follows that, in Icy Sidewalk, A’s desire to avoid patches of ice was one of their
reasons for walking to the library. This is problematic.
As above, rationalization is well-suited to solve this problem: it is a relation with the
appropriate fineness-of-grain. I give more detail in section 6.2, but, in order to see the
idea, consider a revised version of REASONS, where E is an event involving A’s body,
and D is a description of E:
REASONS*. If D is an intentional action, A’s reasons for D are (or are a function of) the mental
states
that non-deviantly caused E and rationalized D.
To use the familiar gloss on rationalization, it seems plausible that a desire to avoid ice
does not ‘render intelligible’ walking to the library. REASONS* promises to explain
why it is not among A’s reasons for walking to the library.
4.4 A More Conservative Solution?
There might be concepts other than rationalization that can be added to the Causal
Theory to solve these problems. I do not know of any, although of course such concep-
tual innovation would be welcome. I want to suggest here, however, that innovation of
some kind is needed, as the prospects are dim for a conservative solution that appeals
only to concepts in ACTION- and REASONS-.
I am pessimistic because a very natural conservative strategy is a nonstarter. To see
why, recall that both problems turn on the observation that causation is too coarse-
grained a relation to perform necessary work. A natural conservative strategy is thus
to individuate events in a finer-grained way than Davidson did (and I assumed
above), so that each description of an action corresponds to (or is identical to) a dis-
tinct event. One might, for example, appeal to Kim’s theory of events [1976], which
8 I discuss a similar case elsewhere [2016].
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identifies events with property instantiations (individuated by triples of entities, prop-
erties, and times). Kim’s theory entails that each description of an action corresponds
to a different event, and so allows that, for example, the flipping of the switch might
have a different cause than the alerting of the prowler.
Unfortunately, given any plausible theory of causation, this idea goes nowhere.
Even if alerting the prowler and flipping the switch are different events, they share
common causes. A’s alerting the prowler was (in part) caused by their desire to illumi-
nate the room, and A’s walking on the sunny side of the street is caused (in part) by
their desire to check the book out of the library. This will be true of Davidsonian or
non-Davidsonian theories of causation, and even on theories that deny that causation
is transitive [Lewis 1973; Schaffer 2005].
This does not show a conservative solution is impossible. But it makes me
sufficiently pessimistic that I think it is worth considering whether there is an
account of rationalization that avoids the second Setiya-inspired argument. I turn to
that question now.
5. A Design Specification for the Rationalization Relation
The lesson of the second Setiya-inspired argument is that the rationalization condition
must be qualified in order to be plausible. In this section, I state four constraints that a
theory of rationalization (that is, a theory of what it is for a set of mental states to
rationalize an action under a description) would have to meet in order to avoid coun-
terexamples. Two derive from the Setiya-inspired argument, and two derive from other
platitudes about motivating reasons. Some of the constraints are controversial, but I
think that all four are quite plausible, and they are widely enough held in conjunction
that it is worth considering whether a theory of rationalization can satisfy all four.
The first Setiya-derived constraint is simply that the theory of rationalization must
avoid the very strong guise-of-the-good thesis:
No GUISE. The theory must not entail that one of the causes of any action is a belief with a
normative content.
The second is that the theory of rationalization should allow that agents are sometimes
highly irrational:
Irrationality. The theory must not entail that highly irrational action is impossible.
The theory of rationalization should allow that highly irrational actions, such as trying
to put a coin into a pencil sharpener, can be intentional actions.
The third constraint derives from a platitude about motivating reasons: beliefs,
desires, and intentions can (at least partly) explain action, and so can be (or represent)
motivating reasons.9 Given REASONS*, each type of mental state can stand in the
rationalization relation:
Pluralism. The theory should be consistent with beliefs, desires, intentions, and perhaps other
mental state types being (or representing) motivating reasons.
This constraint is compatible with the idea that beliefs and desires can only rationalize
(and so be motivating reasons) in conjunction with each other. It rules out the idea that
9 This is defended by Davidson [1980a]. For further discussion, see Pryor [2007], Setiya [2011], and Fogal [2018].
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only desires, only intentions, or only beliefs can be motivating reasons. Note that at
least two kinds of beliefs can be motivating reasons—means-ends beliefs (such as
the belief that doing something would promote one of one’s goals) and normative
or evaluative beliefs (such as the belief that something is good).
The final constraint requires that the theory provide guidance about which mental
states rationalize which actions:
Informativeness. The theory should entail specific verdicts about at least some cases.
A theory of rationalization need not be fully worked-out to be promising, but it should
give verdicts in at least some paradigm cases. For example, it should entail that, in Mid-
night Prowler, A’s mental states rationalize flipping the switch but not alerting the
prowler.
6. Unsatisfactory Theories of Rationalization
Satisfying all four constraints is more difficult than one might expect. I will now argue
that the constraints rule out three families of theories of rationalization suggested by
the recent literature. Proponents of the Causal Theory who accept the constraints
must look elsewhere.
6.1 Rationality Theories
A natural idea is to understand the rationalization relation in terms of the idea of
rationality.10 Let A be a creature, let M be a set of A’s mental states, and let D be a
description of an event involving A’s body. Then a schematic version of such a
theory can be stated as follows:
Rationality Theory. M rationalizes D just in case, given that A is in M, it is rational (in some
sense) for A to decide to do D.
Filling in different conceptions of rationality produces different versions of the theory.
Perhaps it is rational for A to decide do D when, given M, D maximizes expected
utility, or when, given M, D’s expected utility is satisfactorily high.
How does this theory fare? Unfortunately, both the maximizing and satisficing ver-
sions of this theory clearly violate the Irrationality Constraint, as each requires that
intentional actions not be highly irrational.
Several philosophers have suggested (in personal communications) that one
might appeal here to an idea of minimal rationality. Perhaps even highly irrational
actions, as in Nagel’s example, manifest a minimal degree of rationality, in some
sense. While this idea has some promise, I know of no substantive development
of the idea of minimal rationality in the literature, nor do I have an intuitive under-
standing of it.11 Without a substantive theory of minimal rationality, the minimal
Rationality Theory does not entail specific verdicts about cases, and so does not
satisfy the Informativeness Constraint. With that being said, as I will discuss in
section 6, perhaps my preferred theory of rationality can be understood as one
way of taking up this suggestion.
10 For ideas in this spirit, see Antony [1989: 157] and Arpaly and Schroeder [2014: 55–6].
11 For some suggestive ideas, though, see Smith [2009].
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6.2 Motivation Theories
A second kind of theory inspired by the literature associates rationalization with
motivation.12 On this view, all and only desires and intentions to perform actions
under particular descriptions rationalize those actions. A schematic version of this
theory is as follows:
Motivation Theory. M rationalizes D just in case M is a set of appropriate motivational states
directed at A’s doing D.
I accept that every action is caused by a motivational state. But the Motivation
Theory fails to satisfy the Pluralism Constraint, as it does not allow beliefs to ration-
alize action.
6.3 Belief Theories
A third kind of theory conceives of rationalization in terms of a relation between the
content of a belief and the relevant description of an action:
Belief Theory. M rationalizes D just in case M is a set of appropriate beliefs.
Like the Motivation Theory, the Belief Theory fails to satisfy the Pluralism Constraint,
and so is unacceptable. However, three different versions of this theory are suggested
by the literature, and each fails in an additional way, which it is useful to consider.
All three types of theories appeal to the idea of a normative reason for action. The
first is inspired by Raz [1999]:
Belief Theory 1. M rationalizes D just in case M consists of the belief that there is a normative
reason for A to do D.
This theory violates the No GUISE Constraint (which Raz rejects). Versions of Belief
Theory 1 appealing to other normative concepts also violate it.
Two other types of theories are more subtle. The first, inspired by Audi [1985],
appeals to beliefs whose contents are (or correspond to) normative reasons:
Belief Theory 2.M rationalizes D just in caseM consists of the belief that P, where P is (or cor-
responds to) a normative reason for A to do D.
This theory entails that agents never do actions for which there are no normative
reasons at all. That is both inconsistent with the Irrationality Constraint and obviously
subject to counterexample, for instance, in cases like Williams’ ‘gin and petrol’ case
[1981].
A third theory, inspired by Parfit [2011: 37] and perhaps Dancy [2000: 95–6],
attempts to avoid such counterexamples:
Belief Theory 3. M rationalizes D just in case M consists of the belief that P, where, if P were
true, P would be (or correspond to) a normative reason for A to do D.
Given Parfit’s own theory of rationality, this theory would violate the Irrationality
Constraint in addition to the Pluralism Constraint. But, strikingly, it also fails to
avoid some counterexamples that it has been thought to avoid. While it capably
handles the ‘gin and petrol’ case, in which a person acts on a false belief that, if
12 This idea is in the spirit of Goldman [1970: 54–5] and Shepherd [2014].
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true, would be a reason, it cannot obviously handle cases like Allan Gibbard [1999]’s
case of Caligula. On many influential views [Gibbard 1999, Bratman 2009], when
Caligula harms an innocent because he desires pleasure and believes that harming
an innocent will bring him pleasure, he has no belief such that, if it were true, it
would be a normative reason for him to harm.13 Yet his belief and desire rationalize
his action.
7. The Davidsonian Theory of Rationalization
Do these arguments support pessimism about one or more of these constraints, or
about appeal to the rationalization condition itself? I think not. In this section, I
sketch a theory that can satisfy all four constraints. I cannot offer a full elaboration
or defence of the theory here, and so my discussion is something of a promissory
note: if a theory like this one can be made plausible, then the subset problems
provide substantial motivation for the rationalization condition.
The theory of rationalization that I prefer is inspired by Davidson’s early discussion
of rationalization [1980c: 85–6]:
When is an action (described in a particular way) reasonable in the light of specific beliefs and
pro attitudes? One way to approach the matter is through a rather abstract account of practical
reasoning.… [I]f someone acts with an intention [i.e., acts intentionally], he must have atti-
tudes and beliefs from which, had he been aware of them and had the time, he could have
reasoned that his action was desirable… If we can characterize the reasoning that would
serve, we will in effect have described the logical relations between descriptions of beliefs
and desires, and the description of an action, when the former give the reasons with which
the latter was performed.
In contemporary terms, Davidson’s idea is that mental states rationalize a creature’s
action when the creature could have reasoned from those mental states to a decision
to perform the action.14 The agent need not have engaged in the relevant piece of
reasoning (or any reasoning whatsoever); the point is that they could have done so.
Davidson’s theory can thus be put schematically:
Davidsonian Theory 1. M rationalizes D just in case A could reason from M to the decision to
do D.
Filling out this theory requires specifying what is meant by ‘A could reason fromM to
the decision to do D’, and it could be spelled out in a variety of different ways.
I will now show how to develop Davidson’s ideas into a theory that can satisfy the
four constraints. My version of the Davidsonian Theory draws on a widely discussed
conception of practical reasoning.15 The main idea is that there are norms of reasoning
that permit various possible or actual transitions of thought. Norms of theoretical
reasoning govern transitions from doxastic states to doxastic states, while norms of
practical reasoning govern transitions from sets of mental states (such as pairs of
beliefs and desires) to decisions to act. Examples of permissible theoretical reasoning
patterns include enumerative induction, statistical inference, abduction, and
13 This will be disputed by philosophers, such as Schroeder [2007], who accept this consequence. Those philo-
sophers should nonetheless reject Belief Theory 3, on Pluralism Constraint grounds.
14 Davidson [1980c: 84] at this time identified pro-attitudes with judgments that specific actions are desirable.
15 This picture of the reasoning can be found in Broome [2013], as well as McHugh and Way [2016b]. It is also
closely associated with the ‘Reasoning View’ about normative reasons: see Hieronymi [2011], Silverstein [2016],
McHugh and Way [2016a], and Way [2017]. For my version of the Reasoning View, see Asarnow [2016, 2017].
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conjunction introduction, while (as I discuss below), examples of permissible practical
reasoning patterns include instrumental reasoning and enkratic reasoning. The norms
of both theoretical and practical reasoning are defeasible or non-monotonic, in that
they may permit the transition from a set of premise states to a conclusion state
without permitting the transition from some strictly larger set of premises states to
the same conclusion state.16 In part because of this, engaging in a permissible
pattern of reasoning is necessary but not sufficient for reasoning well, in a more
robust sense.17 One reasons permissibly in this sense, but badly in a more robust
sense, when, for example, one infers that the population will resemble a sample,
despite evidence that the sample is not representative.
Given this idea, I can state a more precise version of the Davidsonian Theory:
Davidsonian Theory 2.M rationalizes D just in case the norms of reasoning permit the transition
from M to a decision to do D.
This is one natural interpretation of Davidson’s idea, and I argue that it can satisfy all
four constraints while solving both subset problems.
7.1 The No GUISE, Pluralism, and Irrationality Constraints
My argument turns on three assumptions about reasoning. Two concern which pat-
terns of practical reasoning are permissible, and both have been defended at length
by John Broome [2013: chs. 14, 16]. Together, they allow Davidsonian Theory 2 to
satisfy No GUISE and Pluralism.
The first concerns enkratic reasoning:
Enkratic Reasoning Assumption. The norms of practical reasoning permit reasoning from nor-
mative beliefs and means-ends beliefs to decisions to act.
On one plausible view, the norms permit reasoning from a belief that you ought to do
E, and a belief that doing M is a way of doing E, to a decision to do M. But I leave open
exactly what kinds of beliefs (normative and instrumental) can be premises in enkratic
reasoning.
The second assumption concerns instrumental reasoning:
Instrumental Reasoning Assumption. The norms of practical reasoning permit reasoning from
intentions or desires and means-ends beliefs to decisions to act.
Again, there is room for disagreement, but, on one plausible view, the norms permit
reasoning from an intention to do E, and a belief that doing M is a way of doing E,
to a decision to do M.
Given these assumptions, Davidsonian Theory 2 satisfies Pluralism, as it allows that
normative beliefs, means-ends beliefs, and desires can rationalize action and thus
count as motivating reasons. And it satisfies No GUISE because it counts instrumental
reasoning as permissible reasoning.
A third assumption allows Davidsonian Theory 2 to satisfy Irrationality—reasoning
permissibly does not guarantee much rationality:
16 I make this idea precise in [2017].
17 Other necessary conditions might include, for example, that the agent is responsive to the norms of reasoning
[Broome 2013: 245–7], or that the agent does not believe any ‘defeaters’ for the pattern of reasoning.
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Reasoning = Rationality Assumption. It is possible for A to be highly irrational in doing D,
even though the event described by D was caused by mental statesM and the norms of reason-
ing permit the transition from M to a decision to do D.
This assumption reflects the defeasibility of the norms of good reasoning: reasoning
well (in this specific sense) does not guarantee being rational, or reaching the best con-
clusion. Recall the example discussed above, in which a person reasons in a way per-
mitted by the norms (inferring that a population resembles a sample) despite reasoning
very badly, in the sense that they ignore evidence that the sample is not representative.
Similarly, someone might reason from an intention and a means-ends belief to a
decision to take the means to their intended end, despite their possessing other
mental states that make it highly irrational for them to take that means.
This assumption allows the Davidsonian Theory to satisfy the Irrationality Con-
straint. Highly irrational action is possible when the agent engages in a permissible
pattern of reasoning, but possesses other mental states that make acting in that way
highly irrational. Indeed, some natural interpretations of Nagel’s example are along
these lines. Perhaps this person irrationally formed the belief that their thirst will be
satisfied by putting the coin in the pencil sharpener, despite other beliefs to the con-
trary. Or perhaps their thirst caused them to irrationally form an intrinsic desire to
put the coin in the pencil sharpener, a desire that doesn’t cohere with their other
mental states [Smith 2004a]. In either case, their action is caused by mental states
that instantiate a permissible pattern of reasoning (say, instrumental reasoning from
a desire and a means-ends belief), but the agent is highly irrational to act on that
belief and desire, given the rest of their mind.
7.2 The Informativeness Constraint
Can the Davidsonian Theory satisfy the Informativeness Constraint? Above, I com-
plained that a minimal version of the Rationality Theory could not do so, at least in
the absence of a substantive theory of minimal rationality. Given the three assumptions
from above, I argue that Davidsonian Theory 2 can satisfy the constraint.
Begin with the first subset problem. Applied to Midnight Prowler, this is the
problem of explaining the difference between the person’s flipping of the switch and
their alerting the prowler. The rationalization condition, interpreted in terms of the
Davidsonian Theory, solves this problem. The person’s action, in this case, is caused
in part by a desire to illuminate the room and a belief that flipping the switch is a
means to doing that. The Davidsonian Theory entails that those mental states ration-
alize flipping the switch, because the Instrumental Reasoning Assumption guarantees
that the norms of reasoning endorse the transition from that belief and that desire to
the decision to flip the switch. By contrast, the norms of reasoning do not permit the
transition from any of the causally efficacious mental states to a decision to alert the
prowler. So, the Davidsonian Theory has an explanation of why flipping the switch
is a description under which the action is intentional, but alerting the prowler is not.
Now turn to the second subset problem. Applied to Icy Sidewalk, this is the problem
of explaining why it is possible that the agent’s desire to check out the book is (or
specifies) their reason for walking to the library, but not for walking on the sunny
side of the street, even though those two descriptions describe the same event. The
Davidsonian Theory explains how this is possible. Plausibly, the norms of reasoning
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permit the transition from the desire to check out the book and an appropriate means-
ends belief to the decision to walk to the library, but not to the decision to walk on the
sunny side of the street. So, the Davidsonian Theory entails that the desire rationalizes
(and so is, or specifies, a motivating reason) for one but not the other. Of course, the
Davidsonian Theory is compatible with the possibility that, in some cases, the agent’s
desire to walk to the library rationalizes walking on the sunny side of the street (if, for
instance, their walking was caused in part by a belief that walking on the sunny side of
the street is a way to go to the library). But the Davidsonian Theory leaves open the
possibility that it is not.
A fully informative version of the Davidsonian Theory would offer a theoretical
basis for the three assumptions on which I rely here. However, because the assump-
tions are widely accepted and (in my view) quite plausible, I think that they allow
the Davidsonian Theory to be sufficiently informative for present purposes.
Notably, those who are antecedently sympathetic to the minimal version of the
Rationality Theory are welcome to see the Davidsonian Theory as a version of such
a theory. While the Reasoning= Rationality Assumption ensures that being motivated
by states that instantiate a permissible pattern of reasoning is compatible with being
highly irrational, it is consistent with the idea that engaging in such a pattern is a
kind of (very) minimal rationality. Those who are inclined to understand instantiating
a permissible pattern of reasoning as a kind of minimal rationality are welcome to
understand the Davidsonian Theory as one way to implement the minimal Rationality
Theory.
8. Conclusion
This paper has argued for three conclusions. First, the subset problems motivate
enriching the Causal Theory with some concept beyond those of non-deviant causa-
tion and the mental states. Second, pace Setiya, the rationalization condition can do
the job, at least if understood in terms of the Davidsonian Theory. Finally, no other
satisfactory theory of rationalization is readily available. In the absence of other sol-
utions to the subset problems, I take these three conclusions to provide substantial
support for the ‘Davidsonian Causal Theory’—ACTION* and REASONS* sup-
plemented with Davidsonian Theory 2.
I want to conclude this discussion by reflecting on two questions that the David-
sonian Causal Theory raises. The first concerns whether the theory is unacceptable
on naturalistic grounds, given that it makes reference to the idea of the norms of reason-
ing. Many proponents of the causal-psychological theory of action see philosophical
theorizing about action as broadly continuous with (other kinds of) scientific theoriz-
ing about agency, and see the Causal Theory as a theory, not only of human action, but
of the actions of other creatures as well. One might worry that those broadly natura-
listic commitments rule out appeal to norms of reasoning.
There are two reasons to think that this objection is unpersuasive. One is simply
that it is not obvious that any appeal to normative facts renders a theory naturalistically
unacceptable [Davidson 1980a; Gibbard 2012]. Arguably, any scientific enterprise
requires appeal to normative facts, and the Davidsonian Causal Theory is compatible
with various naturalistic views in metaethics, including quasi-realism and naturalistic
reductionism. Second, Schroeder [2003] has persuasively argued that facts about the
norms of reasoning should not be understood as normative facts. So, naturalistically
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inclined philosophers of action should not reject the Davidsonian Causal Theory too
hastily.
The second question concerns the relationship between motivating reasons and
normative reasons. Interestingly, the theory of motivating reasons generated by David-
sonian Theory 2 bears some resemblance to a family of theories of normative reasons
that analyse facts about normative reasons in terms of the norms of practical reasoning,
often called the Reasoning View about normative reasons.18 According to Davidsonian
Theory 2, an agent’s motivating reasons for having done D are (or are a function of)
those mental states that caused the event that D describes and and that could have been
the premises of a good piece of reasoning concluding in the decision to do D.
According to a simplified version of the Reasoning View about normative
reasons, a normative reason for A to do D is the content of a possible mental state
in a possible piece of good reasoning concluding in the decision to do D.
Philosophers inclined to think that there is a close relationship between normative
reasons and motivating reasons may find this a source of appeal for the Reasoning
View about normative reasons.19 Importantly, however, the Davidsonian Theory
about rationalization is independent of the Reasoning View about normative
reasons, and it can be accepted by philosophers with many different views about nor-
mative reasons.20
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